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Germanification, Cultural Mission, 
Holocaust
Theatre in Łódz´ during World War II
—ANSELM HEINRICH
During World War II, the “war in the East,” or the Weltanschauungskrieg (“war 
of ideologies”), as the Nazis termed it, was intended to go beyond previous mili-
tary conflicts.1 Apart from military and economic objectives, this war was about 
Lebensraum, about acquiring new territories for the “Germanic master race,” 
about the brutal and lasting reshaping of Eastern Europe. As part of this reshap-
ing, “the Nazis conducted a cultural campaign in which theatre…was a major 
component.” This campaign was intended to illustrate serious commitment to 
the newly acquired territories and their inhabitants.2
The Warthegau, a Reichgau (a subdivision in an area annexed by Nazi Ger-
many) in central Poland was one such region being incorporated into the Reich. 
The fact that its German minority was relatively small made it even more impor-
tant in the eyes of Nazi propagandists to subject the region to a sustained pro-
gram of “Germanification,” in which theatre played a crucial role.3 The region’s 
industrial powerhouse, Łódź, was Poland’s third largest city with a population of 
680,095, and in September 1939 it became the “most Easterly major city in Ad-
olf Hitler’s Reich.” Here, the Nazis intended to “erect a bulwark of German cul-
ture in the East based on the unshakeable belief in the victorious and continuing 
existence of the Third Reich.”4 A central part of this “bulwark” was the founda-
tion of a lavishly funded municipal theatre for the rising German-speaking mi-
nority, an undertaking high on the agenda of the Nazi propaganda machine. 
More than other art forms, the theatre was called upon to encourage “Ger-
man character [to] flourish” in the East. District president Friedrich Uebelhoer 
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charged artistic director Hans Hesse and his staff with the “consolidation and 
stabilization” of German traditions and the fostering of German culture. Fit-
tingly for this purpose, the opening production by the Theater der Stadt Lodsch 
(“Lodsch” was the German version of Łódź’s name until the Nazis renamed 
the city “Litzmannstadt”) was a German classic: Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s 
Minna von Barnhelm. On occasion of its premiere on January 13, 1940, Mayor 
Schiffer claimed that the city, which had been founded by the “industriousness 
and ability” of German merchants over a hundred years ago, was now (right-
fully) returning into German hands, after having suffered from an “inorganic 
and racially inferior” character due to the “influx of a quarter of a million Jews” 
and “conscious neglect by the Polish state.”5 The theatre, therefore, was suddenly 
expected to shoulder a responsibility beyond the immediate need to entertain 
audiences; it also played a crucial role in changing the character of city and re-
gion to exemplify the success of the occupiers’ wider cultural and political mis-
sion. In fact, the success of this mission in the Warthegau was in small measure 
dependent on the triumph of Łódź’s prestigious new German theatre.
In this article I discuss the short history of the German language theatre 
in Łódź (Lodsch/Litzmannstadt) during World War II and evaluate to what ex-
tent the Nazis were able to turn it into a success. I investigate the Nazis’ under-
takings in quantitative and qualitative terms by looking at attendance figures, 
funding, and infrastructure, as well as the attempt to produce the “right” kind 
of repertoire—uplifting, serious, and völkisch. (The term “völkisch” derives from 
the German word Volk [people]. It has strong nationalistic, racial, romantic, and 
folkloric undertones, which, in its emphasising of the “Blood and Soil” idea, 
combine with an antiurban populism. The völkisch movement was also charac-
terized by anticommunist, anti-immigration, anticapitalist, antiparliamentarian 
and particularly strong antisemitic undercurrents.) The existing research has 
largely failed to acknowledge the importance of the arts in the Germanification 
of large parts of Eastern Europe during the war. Łódź as one of its main urban 
centers was crucial to this undertaking and thus deserves attention.6
Occupation
On September 9, 1939, German forces occupied Łódź, eight days after Nazi Ger-
many’s invasion of Poland. Within a few months the whole region was branded 
Reichsgau Wartheland and incorporated into the “Greater German Empire.” The 
city was renamed Litzmannstadt in honor of a German general Litzmann who 
fought there during World War I, and it was one of the biggest ghettos (for 
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Jews) in Eastern Europe. Over the following years the Germans tried to estab-
lish Łódź as a predominantly German city,7 expelled parts of the Polish and 
Jewish population (90,000 Jews and Poles by the end of 1939), and attempted 
to replace them with Germans. By the end of the war some 400,000 Germans 
from within Germany (Reichsdeutsche) and a further 600,000 Germans from 
across Europe (Volksdeutsche) were resettled in the Warthegau. Theatre played 
a major role in promoting Germanification in the city. Uebelhoer claimed in 
September 1940: “To foster German culture is one of our chief purposes in the 
German East. German theatre art in particular as one of its chief expressions 
(and represented here by the municipal theatre) is called upon to allow Ger-
man national traditions, which have been suppressed before, to blossom again 
and to award this region with the cultural character it deserves.”8 Money was be-
ing poured into Litzmannstadt’s theatrical undertakings, providing substantial 
prestige for the Germans. Properties, scenery, and costumes were bought, new 
staff hired, the theatre building upgraded, and an elaborate system of advertis-
ing instigated. The theatre had its own operetta and ballet ensembles, the newly 
founded professional municipal orchestra was at its disposal, and in early 1942 
the city opened a second venue for theatrical entertainment, the Kammerspiele 
(studio) in General Litzmann Street (the so-called Sängerhaus). Later that year a 
dance school associated with the playhouse was founded, and during the 1943–
1944 season, the theatre introduced grand opera. In a few years’ time the cul-
tural landscape of the city had changed substantially.
Łódź developed into a predominantly Polish city following the departure 
of sizeable Russian and German minorities by 1918.9 After the German occupa-
tion during World War II, members of the Polish majority became second-class 
citizens dominated by their German oppressors.10 The demands on the theatre 
were clear in this context. It was expected to provide the rising German popu-
lation with the relevant cultural and propagandistic “ammunition” to establish 
and assert itself in the “German East.”
Germanisierung
Even the German occupiers admitted—albeit only in internal papers—that 
Łódź was not and never had been a German city—neither politically nor cul-
turally.11 Nevertheless, the drive to make Łódź German was immediately ob-
vious and carried through with a conviction, brutality, and speed that stunned 
the Polish population. Although the files of the civic authorities (which have 
largely survived the war) were written in a matter-of-fact style and used typical 
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administrative jargon, they display some of the occupiers’ broadly held beliefs. 
What shines through is a deep feeling of superiority communicated by a cho-
sen elite who feel justified in colonizing the “wild East.”12 These attitudes were 
played out in the public arena immediately and without any hint of sensitivity—
not even against the German minority who had largely lived peacefully along-
side the Polish population and whose German name of the city, Lodsch, was 
entirely disregarded and only used for the first few months of the occupation. 
Instead, the name Litzmannstadt was conjured up, even though it had no his-
torical roots there and was forced on the city in April 1940 on Hitler’s direct 
order.13 The aggressiveness of the occupiers was also illustrated by the name 
changes for streets. Apart from the new Hermann Göring, Rudolf Hess, General 
Litzmann, Dietrich Eckart, and Schlageter Streets, even the world famous Łódź 
thoroughfare Piotrkowska was renamed Adolf Hitler Street.
Turning Łódź into a German city, however, did not stop at name-changes 
for streets. By early 1940, the Nazis had detailed plans for a massive building 
program. The city’s senior planning officer Wilhelm Hallbauer produced a re-
port on “spatial issues in Lodsch,” which he sent to different Reich ministries. 
One of the driving forces for the building plans was that the Germans consid-
ered the quality of housing in Łódź to be unacceptable to them.14 Their sugges-
tions for changes were radical. The city’s main railway station was to be moved 
from the east to the west of the city, all manufacturing was to be moved to the 
outskirts (a substantial part of the city’s manufacturing base was located in the 
city center or nearby), and the Polish population was to be moved out of the 
city center and “crammed into other bits of the former city.” The planners in-
tended to build a whole new suburb for the incoming German population to-
ward the west of the new railway station, which was to house “approximately 
25,000 people,” and for which entire areas needed to be torn down. Plans quickly 
evolved and Gauleiter (Regional Director) Greiser soon suggested that the new 
suburb should hold up to 100,000 people. A new main road “of two kilome-
ters length” would connect the railway station with the old city center. At the 
one end of this new axis were the city chambers and a new building for the Na-
tional Workers’ Association (Arbeitsfront), and at the other a massive new “Peo-
ple’s Hall” (Volkshalle) for 12,000 people. Figures and plans seem to have been 
changed almost at will and without any consideration for the existing infra-
structure and the residents involved. Even planning experts in Berlin, not nor-
mally known for their modest approach to town planning, were baffled and sug-
gested to Greiser that he might want to consult the German railways first before 
moving railway stations around.15 Greiser and his team, however, had already 
started substantial building, and widespread demolition in inner-city districts 
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had begun at the end of 1939. New inhabitants from the Reich were tempted into 
the city, and companies were lured to the East with promises that they would be 
able reinvest profits made in the Reich free of taxes in the Warthegau region.16
The official statistics looked impressive: while the city’s overall population 
decreased, the German minority rose steadily from 80,000 in 1939, to 129,000 
in 1942, and to 135,000 in 1943.17 The percentage of Germans in the wider 
Warthegau region had increased similarly from 6.6 percent in 1939 to almost 
23 percent in 1944.18 Monthly statistical reports documented Litzmannstadt’s 
radical development in order to illustrate it as a “success” story for local, re-
gional, and national authorities. The reports also reflected tremendous growth—
in electricity and gas consumption, in the number of people owning a radio or 
a car, in the number of people using the trams and saving their money at the 
Sparkasse bank, and in the number of books in the city library and in their cir-
culation. In April 1942 Litzmannstadt had twelve cinemas with 7,000 seats and 
monthly audiences of around 335,000.19 New city guides were needed for this 
expanding “German” city, and the official Publikationsstelle Berlin­Dahlem was 
quick to commission new publications.20 In 1942 the German UFA film com-
pany even produced a feature-length propaganda film entitled Łódź Turns into 
Litzmannstadt (Aus Łódź wird Litzmannstadt) written by Hans F. Wilhelm, to 
document the radical transformation.21 It almost seemed as if the German oc-
cupiers wanted to found an entirely new city, a fortress against the “uncivilized 
hordes in the East,” an outpost of German culture.22 The large ghetto toward the 
north of the city center did not play any part in the planning exercises, although 
by 1942 it housed almost 250,000 people. Corresponding to the Nazis’ fondness 
for euphemisms, the ghetto was almost exclusively referred to as Litzmannstadt 
Nord, as if it were a suburb like all others.23
The Arts
From the beginning, the arts played a crucial part in what the Nazis perceived 
as their cultural “crusade” in the new Litzmannstadt. The exhibition German 
Art in the East (Deutsche Kunst im Ostraum), which took place from late 1940 
to early 1941 in the city’s art museum, is just one example of how closely linked 
art and politics were supposed to be.24 Newly found institutions such as the 
Deutsches Volksbildungswerk / Volksbildungsstätte Litzmannstadt (the Center for 
Public Education) or the events organized by the Kreiskulturring, as well as the 
municipal office for cultural affairs (Städtisches Kulturamt), acted as additional 
means to create and foster a distinctly German cultural community. Events were 
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held entirely in German (Polish citizens were not even admitted) and often fea-
tured guests from the Altreich (Germany’s 1939 borders) or international stars. 
Concerts organized by the Kreiskulturring between 1942 and 1944, for example, 
featured conductors, soloists, and ensembles from Berlin, Hamburg, Vienna, 
and Rome, and soloists included such internationally renowned stars as the 
pianist Wilhelm Kempff or the violinist Wolfgang Schneiderhan, and conduc-
tors such as Eugen Jochum and Count Hidemaro Konoye from Japan.25 In the 
summer of 1943, the Volksbildungsstätte Litzmannstadt organized approximately 
ten events per month and offered language classes, lectures, screenings, and 
concerts. Their work was deemed particularly important, as it promised to bring 
together Germans who had already lived in Łódź before 1939 and the new arriv-
als, as Gauleiter Greiser claimed. Mayor Werner Ventzki summed up what Ger-
man popular education meant during this war. The main goal of the Volksbil­
dungsarbeit was “to communicate to all German nationals the knowledge about 
the national treasures and cultural assets the war was being fought over. The bet-
ter you know your nation’s language, history, and culture, the more you will be 
steeped in its importance and its historical mission. At the same time you will 
be able to appreciate that this war is being fought for nothing less than the eter-
nal safeguarding of everything German.”26 Also in the summer of 1943, a series 
of big sporting events raised money for the Winterhelfswerk (winter relief orga-
nization) with soccer games, children’s parties, parachute show jumping, gym-
nastics, cycling, boxing, and swimming. These events were accompanied by a 
cultural program as well.27 Overall, the amount of money spent on cultural af-
fairs in general was staggering: Litzmannstadt received its own professional mu-
nicipal symphony orchestra, as well as a municipal music school and a new 
dance college attached to the civic theatre. Further plans included a Museum 
of Natural Science, a Museum of Anthropology, a Museum for Science and the 
Arts, and a number of art galleries.28
Before the German occupation, however, and contrary to Nazi claims, Łódź 
had been anything but a cultural desert. It boasted a rich and multilingual per-
formance tradition with subsidized theatres, variety playhouses, and circuses 
featuring performances in Polish, Russian, German, and Hebrew. The city’s 
three main playhouses, Teatr Miejski, Teatr Polski, and Teatr Popularny, pro-
duced popular entertainment as well as more challenging fare. The municipal 
Teatr Miejski, for example, staged elaborate productions with professional actors 
in a repertoire consisting not only of Polish plays but also plays by Shaw, Scribe, 
Sardou, Shakespeare, Schiller, Galsworthy, Strindberg, Hauptmann, Ibsen, and 
Gogol.29 For the years 1934, 1935, and 1936 the theatre produced an average of 
400 performances annually with rising attendance figures reaching 152,000 in 
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1936.30 During the 1938–1939 season the Teatr Miejski employed two artistic di-
rectors, seven directors and producers, nine administrative staff, one drama-
turge (doradca literacki), and no fewer than fifty-five actors.31 This was a major 
theatre and, judging from its size alone, one that could have rivaled almost any 
municipal playhouse in Germany.
Despite later Nazi claims to the contrary, the German-speaking minority 
largely appreciated the work done by the Polish language theatre. For example, 
on the occasion of the retirement of Kazimierz Wroczyński (who had been the 
director of the Teatr Miejski between 1923 and 1925 and again between 1933 and 
1939), the German newspaper Neue Lodzer Zeitung on behalf of the German 
Verein der Theaterfreunde in Lodz extended “cordial words of farewell,” stating 
that “Wroczyński has made a great contribution to Lodz’s theatrical life… Al-
though he suffered a financial fiasco this is not really his fault but is due to the 
particular situation in Lodz and a general atmosphere which is not conducive 
to producing great theatrical art.”32 Only three months later, the city was occu-
pied by German forces amid claims it was in desperate need of artistic renewal 
after years of cultural neglect.
Foundation of the German-Language 
Municipal Theatre in Łódz´
Łódź was not unlike many other conquered cities across Europe where the Ger-
man occupiers sought to erect their own theatres as a sign of confidence, com-
mitment, and permanence. After a number of guest performances by the en-
semble of the Breslau municipal theatre in autumn 1939, the German language 
Theater der Stadt Lodsch opened its doors in January 1940.33 It was situated 
in Moltkestraße, off the main thoroughfare Piotrkowska in central Łódź, and 
seated 747 people. The opening production was performed by the German lan-
guage theatre company of the Baltic city of Reval on January 13, 1940, and it was 
this company under the direction of Hans Hesse that became Litzmannstadt’s 
standing theatre ensemble.
So far this account of events suggests a straightforward and planned de-
velopment that Nazi propagandists were able to use to their advantage. Look-
ing behind the scenes proves more complex. The files reveal that in the weeks 
and months preceding the opening performance, chaos reigned. Immediately 
after the German occupation of Łódź, it seemed as if the existing German ama-
teur dramatic society (Thalia Theater­Verein) would continue to offer theat-
rical entertainment. Then, in mid-October, a newspaper article promised an 
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“immediate re-opening” of a German theatre, but gave no indication as to when 
this might happen and whether this would be a receiving or a standing theatre. 
The Breslau company was then invited to give a number of guest performances, 
and by the end of October a municipal theatre seemed in the offing—but not 
growing out of the local Thalia ensemble. This group, instead, was given no role 
in the future developments apart from the thankless task of “supplying the new 
theatre with a substantial audience.” On December 7 the press suddenly an-
nounced that a contract with the Reval company under Hans Hesse had been 
signed, and that (despite the fact that the beginning of the season was as yet 
unconfirmed) “the artists will be arriving in Łódź tomorrow morning.”34 This 
abrupt turn of events surprised not only the city’s population, but the regional 
authorities as well. On December 8, Hesse asked the regional propaganda office 
in Poznań (Posen) to book hotel accommodations for the whole troupe and an-
nounced that rehearsals would start immediately. Vossler, head of the regional 
propaganda office, had not previously been informed about the arrival of the 
company and sent a furious telefax to his superiors in the Berlin Propaganda 
Ministry the next day asking for clarification. Vossler had no idea where the 
company would be going to perform; he did not even know where to put them 
up.35 Łódź’s new cultural dawn could hardly have been more chaotic.
After the theatre opened in January 1940, local, regional, and national au-
thorities closely monitored it and were keen to receive notes of successes; of 
particular concern were repertoire and attendance figures. Hesse constantly re-
minded the German-speaking population that going to the theatre was an ob-
ligation for every good German—most clearly expressed by buying a season 
ticket. These “reminders,” however, tended to be far from subtle. In fact, poten-
tial patrons were almost bullied into fulfilling their “obligation.” After all, it was 
supposed to be their duty to play their part in the expansion of German cul-
ture in the East.36 At the of the 1941–1942 season, for example, the theatre’s man-
agement published a special edition of the program notes, which not only con-
tained a review of the season about to conclude, but also featured a preview of 
the 1942–1943 season in connection with an “invitation” to take out a season 
ticket.37 Łódź city archives still hold seven issues of this special program note—
indicative of its print run, for the entire city administration seems to have been 
flooded with these flyers—sometimes even several times. The office for cultural 
affairs exerted substantial pressure on colleagues in other departments by dis-
tributing circulars that staff members had to sign.
What is noteworthy in connection with these program notes is that they 
looked strikingly similar to those of other German theatres at the time. They fea-
tured advertisements by local (German) businesses, photos of members of the 
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ensembles, theatre anecdotes and biographies, dramaturgical pieces concerning 
particular productions (and largely written by the theatre’s chief dramaturge), 
articles concerning the theatre’s history, inserts with the week’s repertoire, and, 
last but not least, a substantial political section. This section featured statements 
and sometimes whole speeches by leading politicians, as well as photos both of 
national, regional, and local party representatives. After the opening of the the-
atre in early 1940 until the beginning of the 1940–1941 season, program notes ap-
peared quite spartan; from September 1940 onward, however, they were much 
more elaborate and grand both in quantitative and qualitative terms, which 
seemed only fitting for an important outpost of Germanic culture in the East.38 
The programs increasingly reported on the activities of similar stages in an-
nexed and occupied territories and featured articles concerning the activities 
of theatre companies operating behind the front lines. Throughout Germany at 
large, the political tone of the programs diminished over the course of the war.39 
What remained was an emphasis on the canonical classical literature with many 
articles on Goethe, Schiller, and Grabbe, among others.
The image of the German artist who is fighting the same war as the German 
soldier but with different means—an ideal frequently referred to by Hitler and 
Goebbels and a popular motif in paintings and sculpture—seemed to ring true 
in the East. It was a message, too, that was constantly hammered home by cul-
tural politicians, practitioners, and party leaders in occupied Eastern Europe. 
In a special program note published just before the 1940–1941 season, drama-
turge Hanns Merck claimed that even in wartime, theatre performed a special 
role in Germany.40 Actors eagerly followed in the footsteps of the soldiers and 
moved into the captured emplacements. Their mission was not an entirely artis-
tic one anymore but had become political. These artists were charged to foster 
the German national spirit in the conquered territories. In Łódź, Merck went 
on to claim, “in this Polish Manchester, hitherto a dirty city of obtrusive Jew-
ish character, they are faced with particular circumstances.” The theatre, there-
fore, was not only meant to be an expression of the superior German culture that 
had rightfully occupied Eastern Europe; it was also charged with uplifting, en-
couraging, and equipping the German minority population with the necessary 
ammunition to continue a different struggle once the army had moved on. The 
German minority was also asked to educate those Germans moving to Łódź, for 
example from the Baltic, who had not been exposed to German culture before. 
It was, therefore, not only the theatre, which had a particular political function 
to fulfil in Łódź, but also its audience.
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Repertoire, Audiences, Funding
To successfully play its role in the propaganda war, the choice of a heroic, Ger-
manic, and uplifting repertoire was crucial. Mayor Schiffer demanded that “the 
German theatre in Lodsch must develop into a fortress of German spirit and 
German culture here in the east of the Reich.” The press was equally ecstatic—
and equally demanding: “It is a matter of course for a German theatre, which has 
to fulfil such an important cultural mission, that only those dramatic works can 
be considered which are products of a truly German mind.” Hesse was happy 
to oblige, and claimed that the theatre had a central role to play in the German-
ification of Łódź: “The actors and their artistic director had to defeat the Pol-
ish-Jewish heritage first before being able to approach the world of poetry. They 
carried out pioneering work, like everyone else who arrived at Łódź in 1939, in 
order to turn a city with a substantial German population in former central Po-
land into a truly German city.”41 The missionary function of the theatre seemed 
best served by focusing on the classical dramatic canon. Not surprisingly, the 
theatre produced Shakespeare’s dramas (Measure for Measure, As You Like It, 
Hamlet [as late as November 1943]) as well as works by Friedrich Schiller (The 
Robbers, Wallenstein’s Camp, Don Carlos), Heinrich von Kleist (The Broken Jug), 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (Emilia Galotti), and Friedrich Hebbel (Maria Mag­
dalena). The theatre performed Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s epic Faust I in 
a production staged seven times in ten days in late April and early May 1943.42 
Apart from the classics, the theatre also incorporated nationalistic and völkisch 
plays into its repertoire—plays that were particularly supported by the Propa-
ganda Ministry. In May 1942 the theatre produced Eberhard Wolfgang Möllers’s 
Das Opfer (The Victim), a production accompanied by intense media coverage,43 
as well as Hermann Burte’s Katte and Felix Dhünen’s Uta von Naumburg.
In a typical week, April 12–19, 1942, the theatre offered fourteen produc-
tions at its two venues, the main house theatre and the studio. Apart from a 
dance production by its own ballet ensemble (which was performed three times 
during this week), the theatre offered Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure (four 
performances), three contemporary comedies by Waldemar Frank, Heinz Steg-
uweit, and Felix Lützkendorf (with four performances between them), and two 
operettas (three performances)44—a respectable showing, one might think. The 
theatre seemed to take its cultural mission seriously. In October 1943, the the-
atre premiered Emmerich Nuß’s comedy Dissonances. Hesse faxed the Leipzig 
publishers of this play afterward to relay the happy news that it had been a huge 
success and “received 28 curtain calls at the end.” As late as November 1943 the 
theatre offered a “week of premieres” with four different plays.45
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In addition to the “correct” choice of repertoire, audience figures were of 
vital importance. The popular success of its theatre was crucial for the Nazi re-
gime, and records in attendance figures were constantly used in its propaganda. 
Failing to attract large audiences would not only have contradicted claims of 
a true “national theatre” (Volkstheater), but would also have compared un-
favorably to the years prior to the German occupation when, according to the 
Nazi propaganda, audiences had been pitiful. To attract the desired record at-
tendances, the theatre offered a mix of individually sold tickets, season tickets, 
block bookings, and reductions for particular groups (members of the armed 
forces were admitted at prices reduced by 30 or 40 percent). Block bookings 
were offered to organizations such as Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy—
which offered eight different schemes of block bookings to its members), the po-
lice force, the city administration, the postal service, the job center, the state rail-
way, the Hitler Youth and other party organizations, and national offices such 
as the customs authority, the board of trade, and the revenue office. There were 
also closed performances for injured soldiers and for schools.46 The system of 
reductions and concessions was so widespread, in fact, that the ordinary full 
ticket prices, which ranged from Reichsmark (RM) 0.70 to RM 4.50, were hardly 
ever paid by anyone. But income, even profit, seemed a secondary concern in 
this system; more important was the fact that the theatre managed to draw in 
the crowds.
Crucially for the city’s cultural ambitions, theatre audiences did indeed rise. 
Between 1941 and 1942 the increase was close to 30 percent. Utilization reached 
80 percent, and at closed performances even over 90 percent.47 In the first half 
of 1942 the theatre seemed to have turned a corner with monthly audiences aver-
aging 25,000. The newly opened studio (Kammerspiele, seating capacity of 479), 
which unashamedly and almost exclusively concentrated on light-hearted fare, 
completed an increasingly successful picture for the Nazi propaganda—at least 
in terms of quantity. During the first half of 1942 the studio presented an average 
of twelve shows per month, attracting some 5,000 patrons.48 In the same season, 
the theatre management introduced operetta to its portfolio, which further in-
creased its popularity. In early 1942 operetta performances achieved ticket sales 
of 93 percent,49 and in late 1942 the theatre was operating at near capacity. In Oc-
tober, it staged fifty-six performances, in December sixty-four, and it reached 
monthly audiences of up to 35,000.50 Although slightly lower, audience figures 
in late 1943 generally held up with utilizations of well over 80 percent.51 Overall, 
audiences rose from 190,000 in 1940–1941 to almost 300,000 in the last two 
seasons, and the number of performances went up from 330 to 572 in the same 
timeframe.52
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Without its elaborate system of closed performances and concessions, 
however, the theatre would never have attracted these record numbers. For ex-
ample, during February 1941 (a typical month) the theatre offered one classical 
drama, one contemporary drama, and five comedies. Out of thirty-one perfor-
mances, twenty were reserved as closed performances (eight of which were for 
KdF [Kraft durch Freude: “Strength through Joy”], but also for the armed forces, 
SA [Sturmabteilung: “Storm Troopers”], Hitler Youth, police, the women’s asso-
ciation [Frauenschutzbund], and city administration). Out of overall audiences 
of 17,500, closed performances accounted for 13,500.53
For the purpose of securing these audiences, the new theatre was gener-
ously funded out of municipal, regional, and national funds. The municipal sub-
sidy rose substantially from RM 562,000 in 1941 to RM 831,000 in 1942. More-
over, Litzmannstadt received substantial sums from the central government. 
This was unusual, as most civic theatres in Germany were almost exclusively 
subsidized out of municipal pots. In fact, this decentralization was a hallmark 
of the German arts funding system. The theatres in the “German east” were dif-
ferent, though. Here, it was not only city councils that paid substantial amounts 
of money but also regional and national authorities. Already in late January 
1940, for example, Mayor Schiffer asked the Propaganda Ministry for almost 
RM 60,000 as a contribution toward the costs of running the theatre. And he 
did not ask for the money politely—he demanded it (“transfer the money as 
soon as possible”). It seems that the city’s officials knew full well that they were 
in a strong position when it came to financial support from Berlin, due in par-
ticular to Litzmannstadt’s status as a “beacon” of German culture in the East—a 
model city. By March 1940 the theatre’s renovation had already cost RM 105,000 
(paid for by the city) and another RM 230,000 was needed from elsewhere. 
Schiffer declared that for 1940/41 the overall theatre budget was going to be RM 
600,000, and that he hoped ministry and region (Gau) would contribute RM 
200,000 each.54 In September 1940 Schiffer asked for a subsidy of RM 250,000 
from the Propaganda Ministry, a sum of previously unheard of proportions, and 
less than a month later he received the notification that the ministry was pre-
pared to pay the full amount.55 Still, the hole in the theatre’s budget grew. Be-
tween September 1940 and late March 1941 the theatre was in the red by a stag-
gering RM 553,000. Undeterred, city officials kept asking for more. For 1942 they 
wanted an increase in national subsidies of 100 percent, RM 400,000 instead of 
the already generous RM 200,000 they had received the year previously. Addi-
tionally, they asked for RM 300,000 for a new theatre building. The head of the 
Reich theatre chamber within the Propaganda Ministry, Rainer Schlösser, cau-
tioned Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels against these enormous 
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sums, and the annual subsidy remained at RM 200,000, but Goebbels agreed to 
contribute RM 150,000 from a “special fund” to the building costs. This means 
that the theatre in Litzmannstadt in 1942 received a phenomenal RM 350,000 
in Reich subsidies. The other theatres in the region were equally pampered. The 
main theatre in Poznań (the Gautheater Posen) in 1941 received RM 400,000, 
and the traveling ensemble of the Landesbühne Gau Wartheland was in receipt 
of RM 50,000. It may not be surprising that Litzmannstadt’s administration got 
carried away. In December 1942 Mayor Ventzki wrote to ask for a Reich subsidy 
of RM 450,000 for 1943. These sums proved too much for the Propaganda Min-
istry, who paid RM 170,000 in 1943—still a substantial sum, however.56
Parallel to rising subsidies for the current theatre operation, the city 
planned for a brand new theatre building, particularly as the existing theatre 
building was inadequate for the staging of grand opera. A site was acquired in 
1941, the project reached the planning stage at the end of that year, and construc-
tion seems to have started soon after that.57 The new theatre apparently made 
use of an older structure (in the vicinity of the existing playhouse on Moltke 
street). The new building was never finished, however; only the shell construc-
tion was finished in 1943. However, on July 1, 1943, work on the site was halted 
as the building project was no longer deemed of strategic importance for the du-
ration of the war.58
In terms of personnel, the theatre was equally spoiled, and its staffing num-
bers were quickly brought up to a level comparable to those in theatres in any 
large German city. At the beginning of the 1940–1941 season, the company con-
sisted of twenty-nine actors, one artistic director, one scene designer, two dra-
maturges, three directors, one conductor, one costume designer, and two ad-
ministrative staff members. At the end of the following season, in July 1942, the 
theatre’s size had increased substantially. At a time when many German the-
atres had to cut down in size and and save resources in view of the war effort, 
the Litzmannstadt theatre continued to grow. Management and senior artistic 
staff comprised sixteen people, and in addition there were another thirteen staff 
members in administration, forty-eight actors, twenty singers in the theatre’s 
own professional chorus, fourteen dancers plus an associated dance school, and 
nine technical staff members.59 In August 1940 Litzmannstadt received its own 
fully funded municipal orchestra for the first time in the city’s history—another 
propaganda coup for the regime, or so it seemed, particularly as the Nazis con-
sistently claimed that the city’s musical life during the 1930s had been charac-
terized by “popular music of Jewish-Polish-American persuasion.”60 The new 
musical director, Adolf Bautze, now headed a professional orchestra of fifty-two 
(which soon afterward reached its full capacity of eighty-five musicians), playing 
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a series of symphony concerts alongside the musical provision for the theatre. 
The orchestra, too, was in receipt of municipal as well as Reich subsidies that 
rose to RM 100,000 in 1943.61 In 1944—after opera had been added to the the-
atre’s repertoire—the theatre still employed twenty-three actors, fifteen opera 
soloists, thirty chorus members, eleven dancers, plus a municipal orchestra of 
fifty musicians, three conductors, one pianist, and two chorus coaches.62 In fact, 
the theatre’s size compared favorably to some of the more established municipal 
theatres, and toward the end of the war it outstripped many of them.63
Salaries, too, compared favorably to other regional German theatres—and 
they rose exponentially within a very short period of time. When the theatre 
opened in January 1940, the average monthly salary of the actors was RM 350.64 
Half a year later the average salary had risen to almost RM 500,65 while during 
the 1941–1942 season the average salary for an actor had risen to RM 600, and 
some of the soloists in the musical theatre received up to RM 1,400.66 On top 
of this increase, every employee received allowances and extra payments (in-
cluding a so-called “development bonus”), which could amount to up to RM 100 
extra per month.67 At the Westphalian theatre of Bielefeld, for example, a typical 
monthly salary for an actor at the same time was just RM 365, half of what their 
colleagues in Litzmannstadt earned.68 Overall salary costs for actors, singers, 
and musicians rocketed from RM 200,000 in 1940 to RM 666,000 in 1942—
more than some Reich theatres received as their total annual subsidy.69
However, rising subsidies did not go unnoticed in the general public, par-
ticularly in a city where living conditions were significantly below the national 
average and money was desperately needed to improve infrastructure, quality 
of housing, and local amenities. As if to counter the criticism, the theatre’s pro-
gram notes featured an article by A. E. Frauenfeld, who justified municipal ex-
penditure on theatres.70 Frauenfeld claimed that having a publicly funded civic 
theatre was a major asset for any city and had a substantial economic impact. To 
illustrate the value he proposed to look at a hypothetical case—a municipal the-
atre in a city of 100,000, with a capacity of 1,000, 150 staff, and a budget of RM 
500,000, of which “between a third and half would be paid by the city as subsi-
dies.” Assuming a realization of 70 percent (which seemed realistic) he arrived at 
annual audiences of 300,000—a substantial figure apparently intended to con-
vince even the staunchest Philistine of the importance of a publicly funded the-
atre. Even aside from the fact that this model did not discuss the repertoire (as 
we have seen, a crucial issue in Litzmannstadt) there are two problems with it: 
first, the sum of RM 500,000 was quickly outstripped as funding needs rock-
eted out of control, and second, the theatre was never able to make up 50 per-
cent (or even 30 percent) of its financial needs itself; the income generated by 
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the box office was significantly lower. Therefore, both civic and national fund-
ing was substantially higher.
Despite the changing fortunes for Nazi Germany as the war went on and the 
front drew nearer, Litzmannstadt’s theatre continued to be in receipt of substan-
tial subsidies and performed its propagandistic role. Looking ahead to the 1943–
1944 season, Hesse boasted about the successful Faust production mentioned 
above, which would compare favorably to the best the big Reich theatres had to 
offer.71 In addition he planned three world premieres for the 1943–1944 season, 
for which a poster was designed to attract season ticket holders.72
Overall, the statistics are staggering. In spring and early summer 1944 
the studio presented an average of twenty shows and attracted monthly atten-
dances of 10,000—double what they were two years prior. In June 1944, the mu-
nicipal theatre still staged twenty-five performances that attracted some 15,000 
people.73 The cultural propaganda seemed to have worked, and the Nazis had 
made their theatre a success.
Problems and Inconsistencies
Despite the grand proclamations, however, a closer look particularly at the the-
atre’s early period reveals that it only achieved “a fraction of what it had hoped 
and planned for.”74 It was clear that despite the bold announcements, the the-
atre’s first few months had not fulfilled the high expectations. As if to buoy him-
self and his colleagues, dramaturge Hanns Merck announced that at least they 
had made a start—only a small consolation given the function this playhouse 
was meant to fulfill both to educate the German population and to stand as a 
bastion of German culture in the East. At the beginning and well into sum-
mer 1940, audiences had been dismal. After a bleak January monthly audiences 
peaked at 17,000 in February but after that fell consistently to below 9,000 in 
June.75 This was a disaster, both in terms of their own expectations but also, 
more importantly, in comparison to audiences attracted by the former Polish 
municipal theatre. The Teatr Miejski had achieved almost three times these fig-
ures in the preceding year.76
Even more problematic in relation to the theatre’s grandiose claims was the 
reality in terms of its repertoire. Contrary to expectations of a high art program 
dominated by classical drama and serious political plays in order to cultivate 
the city and educate its population, the fare actually produced at Litzmannstadt 
was quite pedestrian. As the theatre was under close scrutiny by party offi-
cials and cultural politicians, its dramaturge was at pains to justify its mundane 
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repertoire: “In Litzmannstadt it is important to reach out to audiences, who are 
partly still negotiating their way in a new environment, which so far has been 
largely alien to German theatre. [The theatre, therefore,] has to offer a mixed 
fare, and one which is palatable to people of every age, every class; personnel 
who are only temporarily stationed here and people who have moved here from 
all areas of the Greater German Empire.”77 Merck’s comments are a desperate 
attempt to defend a choice of program that increasingly relied on light enter-
tainment and avoided the classical canon as too heavy. In April 1942, for ex-
ample, the völkisch drama Uta von Naumburg by Felix Dhünen sold only 362 
tickets, and Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure attracted only 101 patrons its 
first night.78 The failure of the völkisch repertoire in particular hurt cultural poli-
ticians. Almost none of the officially celebrated new political drama was pro-
duced in Litzmannstadt—no plays by the German playwrights Hanns Johst (the 
Nazi Poet Laureate), Siegmund Graff, Ernst Bacmeister, Curt Langenbeck, Paul 
Ernst, or Hans Bethge.79 Even worse was the dichotomy between high demands 
and actual output concerning the studio theatre, which, according to announce-
ments by the theatre management on the occasion of its opening, was envisaged 
to stage the classics in particular.80 This classical canon, however, was nowhere 
to be found on the studio’s stages.
Local commentators were shocked. The theatre critic of the Litzmannstädter 
Zeitung, Gustav Röttger, did not buy Merck’s desperate attempts to sell the focus 
on entertainment as part of the “education process” in a largely uncivilized 
Eastern city. “Endowed with substantial sums out of municipal pockets the the-
atre has become everyone’s friend due to some good achievements. In future, 
the goal will be, above all, to look after the dramatic ensemble and repertoire. It 
has to become a bulwark of the German character, a site of great art, which, far 
exposed in the East, can never only entertain, but must become presentable and 
prestigious in a way which it is not quite at the moment.”81 Not surprisingly, city 
officials were not amused, either, and in their voluminous 1943 administrative 
report reminded everyone of the theatre’s function: “Since Schiller and Richard 
Wagner we appreciate the importance of the theatre as a national place of educa-
tion and culture. In the Litzmannstadt region good theatre more than anything 
is called upon to fulfil this function and to become the enunciator of German art 
and spirit.”82 The report made it clear that the theatre must not become a “place 
of sheer amusement or superficial interests.” And then, at the end of this long 
preamble the report stated that Litzmannstadt’s theatre “on the whole” moved 
“in the right direction”—hardly a ringing endorsement.83
The reasons for the meager attendance at productions of classical drama 
were manifold, but their poor quality seems to have been one of the prime 
{  99 }
GERM ANIFIC ATION, CULT UR AL MISSION, HOLOC AUST
causes. Concerning the production of Goethe’s Urfaust, for example, the press 
stated that the actors “tried very hard to give their best,” which when it comes 
to press reviews in Nazi Germany is pretty close to calling it a failure.84 And de-
spite Shakespeare plays being regular features in the repertoire, their perfor-
mances must have been dismal. City officials arrived at the conclusion that “for 
Shakespeare the time has not yet come in Litzmannstadt”—a damning verdict.85 
But it was not only the classical canon that proved problematic. Even allegedly 
less demanding pieces, for example, Max Halbe’s Strom (Stream), failed—and 
even under the direction of Hesse himself. The actors had performed “as best 
they could” and excelled in those parts that “did not require too much intellec-
tual depth.”86 Commentators criticized the theatre for avoiding the serious con-
temporary repertoire and asserted that—contrary to claims by the theatre man-
agement—Litzmannstadt audiences did not “necessarily demand lightweight 
plays.”87
Issues of artistic standards and quality also concerned the municipal or-
chestra. It quickly dawned on local cultural politicians that large subsidies did 
not necessarily translate into great performances. The official 1943 administra-
tive report, for example, certified the orchestra’s “diligent work.” Musical di-
rector Bautze, too, did not seem to have been a successful choice, and several 
official reports mention that he had only conducted choirs before.88 Not surpris-
ingly, the theatre’s first attempts at opera during the 1942–1943 season attracted 
a lukewarm reception. Puccini’s Tosca was “noteworthy” and as an experiment 
“quite successful.”89
Concerning ticket sales, too, the situation was not as rosy as the propa-
ganda made people believe, particularly in the early years. The weekly balance 
sheets the theatre had to provide the city administration (and which were not 
published) are a useful indicator to gauge the popular success of the theatre. 
The theatre’s biggest client in terms of ticket sales was Kraft durch Freude (KdF; 
in English, Strength through Joy), the leisure-time organization that booked 
whole performances for their members. In a typical week in May 1940, for ex-
ample, almost half of the weekly takings of RM 1,400 were guaranteed by KdF 
(RM 600). The theatre, however, faced two problems in connection with this 
system of block bookings. First, this system put organizations such as KdF in a 
very strong bargaining position. For example, KdF hardly ever paid their dues 
on time; in fact they regularly paid only a fraction of what they owed the the-
atre. Second, the apparent success with large organizations and block bookings 
disguised that fact that regular box office takings were often abysmal. During 
the week mentioned above, ticket sales were sometimes as little as RM 150 for 
an evening performance.90
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The precarious financial situation did not go unnoticed. As late as Feb-
ruary 1944 the National Accounting Office (Rechnungshof) carried out an audit 
to check the proper deployment of national subsidies.91 The detailed report 
raised a number of issues and questioned the way the city had recorded income 
and expenditure in its books; it even considered asking for the repayment of 
some of these subsidies. The Accounting Office criticized inflated salaries both 
at the theatre and the orchestra and particularly in view of the immense pres-
sures on the city’s finances and the increasing deficits in the theatre’s budget. In-
deed, some of the honoraria must have raised a few eyebrows among the wider 
public had they been known. A Berlin guest conductor, for example, who stayed 
three weeks in Litzmannstadt to conduct Tosca and who was asked to write a 
report to assess whether local audiences were “ready” for grand opera, received 
the princely sum of RM 4,000, almost three times the monthly salary of Hans 
Hesse. Although musical director Bautze headed the symphony orchestra, he 
did not conduct the orchestra when it played in the theatre even though this was 
common practice at other venues. Instead, the city appointed an additional con-
ductor to conduct musical theatre, although Bautze was “hardly overworked.”92 
The orchestra musicians, too, received extra payments on top of their normal 
salary—something that according to the Accounting Office was not covered by 
existing employment law. These extra payments were all the more surprising 
since the orchestra as a whole was hardly on sound financial footing. In 1940, 
for example, the orchestra’s expenditures of RM 246,100 stood in sharp contrast 
to its box office gross, which only amounted to a meager RM 18,300—in other 
words, it only managed to recoup 7 percent of the subsidies it received.93 Inter-
estingly, this discrepancy occurred despite the fact that the orchestra offered a 
popular program, which avoided too many “difficult” contemporary pieces and 
should have drawn large crowds. Indeed, the Accounting Office criticized the 
orchestra’s programming, as this did not feature the required number of con-
temporary orchestral works and largely played it safe. Instead of the required 
share of 33 percent, Litzmannstadt’s orchestra only managed 15 percent. In its 
report, the National Accounting Office concluded that some key conditions for 
the national subsidy had not been met and that the municipal authorities should 
be asked to pay back some of the money, or indeed all of it—a devastating blow 
to the ambitions of Litzmannstadt’s cultural politicians.
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Conclusion
To establish a German-speaking theatre in Litzmannstadt was a matter of the 
highest priority for the German authorities in the Warthegau and beyond. In his 
“model Gau,” Gauleiter Greiser regarded the performing arts as an important 
“weapon in ethnic struggle,” especially highbrow German culture, which he saw 
as infinitely superior to “gauche Polish entertainment.”94 The sums pumped into 
Litzmannstadt’s theatre both by the municipal authorities and central govern-
ment were truly astounding. Until late 1944, the theatre was deemed to be oper-
ating at the front line of an aggressive Germanification of the city and the wider 
region. In this respect the demands put on the theatre were almost impossible 
to achieve. On the one hand, cultural politicians expected a program of classics 
as well as völkisch and nationalistic drama, for which a mass audience proved 
difficult to find. Two substantial theatre spaces with 479 and 755 seats, respec-
tively, needed to be filled in a city whose German-speaking population even by 
1944 was still relatively small. Spaces, too, were far from ideal, with limited views 
of the stage from some seats, poor heating and drafts, basic performance con-
ditions, and a simple stage technology. On the other hand, the presentation of 
comedies and farces, which did attract larger audiences, hardly related to po-
litical demands. In any case, the municipal authorities closely monitored audi-
ence figures, and the city’s statistical office was keen to receive monthly balance 
sheets. It complained if these did not arrive on time and made sure the calcu-
lations added up. In the end, and despite the vast amounts of money poured 
into the venture, the playhouse fell into oblivion after the city’s liberation in 
early 1945. The theatre and its audience had simply gone, and no traces were 
left. The Polish majority reclaimed and once again dominated the city’s cul-
ture.95 The Nazis had clearly failed in their cultural and geopolitical ambitions 
in Litzmannstadt, despite their reporting to the contrary, and the theatre could 
be seen as exemplifying this fiasco.
However, concluding on this note of failure is insufficient, as it would mask 
the real horror. The fact that Litzmannstadt’s theatre entertained large audi-
ences with a simple repertoire at bargain prices illustrates the validity of Hannah 
Arendt’s dictum of the “banality of evil.”96 Audiences including SS personnel, 
Wehrmacht servicemen, police and Gestapo staff, members of the ghetto ad-
ministration, and other people directly involved in the Holocaust enjoyed light 
entertainment, civilized comedies, and Viennese operetta. They appreciated in-
formative program notes that avoided serious political issues and instead pre-
sented theatrical anecdotes, production photos, and inconspicuous adverts for 
local businesses. The contrast between civilized entertainment and genocide 
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could hardly be starker, yet in Litzmannstadt culture and Holocaust coexisted in 
close proximity, geographically and ideologically.97 The grand opening of a new 
dancing school on September 16, 1942, for example, took place only days after 
the infamous Gehsperre Aktion, during which 12,000 Jews (and in particular 
children, the elderly, and the infirm) were sent to their deaths in the extermina-
tion camp at Chełmno. And in February 1943 Litzmannstadt’s municipal the-
atre presented Ino Wimmer’s Litzmannstädter Bilderbogen (A Picture Book from 
Litzmannstadt) under the title Bitte, alles einsteigen! (All on Board, Please) with 
a tram as a prominent feature in the production.98 The link to the deportations 
from Łódź’s Radogast (Radogoszcz) train station must have been obvious to 
the audiences; maybe the intention of this humorous revue was precisely to 
make light of the connection. The theatre’s artistic director proudly announced 
in summer 1943 that this show, which came across “fresh with local color,” had 
been performed twenty-five times in the studio between February and the close 
of the season in June.99 More research is needed in this area, not least to question 
a discourse that continues to struggle with Arendt’s claim. Suzanne Marchand 
in a 1998 review article, for example, asked whether arts and culture under the 
Nazis were “banality or barbarism.”100 Such approaches establish a problematic 
dichotomy and fail to grasp the situation in places like Litzmannstadt where the 
banal can hardly be separated from the barbaric.
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